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NOTES
Criminal Law: The Permissibility of Multiple
Punishments for One Criminal Offense: Missouri
v. Hunter and Its Effect on Oklahoma Law
The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in
part, "[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." ' This is the double jeopardy clause, made
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment in Benton v. Maryland.2 Although the language seems clear
enough, this particular passage in the fifth amendment has spawned a wealth
of confusing case law, which has been described aptly as a "veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial
navigator." 3 In at least one area, however, clarity has been achieved by the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Hunter,4 although at
substantial cost to the protection afforded an accused by the double jeopardy

clause.
In Hunter, the Court addressed the specific issue of: "[W]hether the prosecution and conviction of a criminal defendant in a single trial on both a
charge of 'armed criminal action' and a charge of first degree robbery-the
underlying felony-violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 5 Prior to Hunter, the answer to this question was unclear. Language
in various opinions suggested that such an issue must be answered in the affirmative because conviction and punishment under two statutes that proscribe the single act committed by an accused was forbidden by the double

jeopardy clause. 6 Other opinions included dicta indicating that such
cumulative punishments would be permissible. 7 In Hunter, however, the

Court unequivocally adopted the position that such multiple convictions and

1. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
2. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
3. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). See also Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1, 9 (1978) ("Our holdings on this subject 'can hardly be characterized as models of consistency and clarity'.").
4. 103 S.Ct. 673 (1983).
5. Id. at 675.
6. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) ("And it [the double
jeopardy clause] protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.").
7. See, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981) ("Thus, the question of
what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what
punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed."). Under this language, statutory
authorization for multiple punishment presumably meets no double jeopardy bar.
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punishments for one single act are not barred by the double jeopardy clause
and are thus constitutionally permissible where a statutory scheme authorizes
this procedure.'
This note will attempt to evaluate the decision in Hunter in several ways. It
will begin with an examination of the historical development of the double
jeopardy clause and decisions thereunder. The Court's opinion in Hunter will
then be considered in light of those previous decisions, and pertinent
criticisms will be voiced. Finally, Oklahoma law will be examined in an effort
to determine what effect, if any, Hunter may have on double jeopardy
jurisprudence in this state.
The Road to Hunter
The question of whether cumulative punishments for a single criminal offense are permissible under the double jeopardy clause is at first a problem of
constitutional construction. The wording of the clause is unclear because
nothing in it defines what is meant by being "twice put in jeopardy" for one
offense. On its face, the clause would not necessarily prevent either multiple
prosecutions or punishments. Therefore, if the wording of the double
jeopardy clause is unclear, determining the intent of the Framers of the Constitution should provide a better understanding of the protection contemplated by the clause.
The initial version of the double jeopardy clause was proposed by James
Madison and submitted to the First Congress. Its wording was much like that
of the proposal finally adopted: "No person shall be subject, except in cases
of impeachment, to more than one punishment or trial for the same offense .

. . . "9

Obviously, Madison intended that prosecutions and punish-

ments were to be treated as functional equivalents for purposes of double
jeopardy."° Thus, it would be a violation of the clause to punish more than
once as well as to prosecute more than once. Several objections were raised
to Madison's proposal because some representatives feared that his language
might prevent a defendant from seeking a new trial after conviction." The
language of the present double jeopardy clause was submitted to ensure that
a defendant could indeed seek a new trial.II However, the change in wording
was not intended to alter the ban against multiple punishments, and the protection afforded by the clause as contemplated by Madison was thought to be
included under the new wording." Although initially the expansive wording
of Madison's proposal appeared to offer more protection than the final dou-

8. Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S.Ct. 673, 679 (1983).
9. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 753 (1789) (emphasis added).
10. This is particularly interesting in light of Justice Marshall's objection that Hunter mandates prohibition against multiple prosecutions but not against multiple punishments. Hunter,
103 S.Ct. at 679 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 753 (1789).
12. Id.
13. Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAL HISTORY 283, 304-06 (1963).
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ble jeopardy clause language, the Framers nevertheless intended that the
4
clause would prohibit multiple punishments for a single criminal offense.
The double jeopardy clause is therefore implicated by the issue of whether
cumulative punishments are permissible.' 5
The Supreme Court recognized the prohibition against multiple
punishments for a single offense at a very early date. In Exparte Lange,'6 the
defendant was convicted for one offense punishable by fine or imprisonment.
The defendant was sentenced to pay a fine and to be imprisoned. In determining the proper disposition of the case, the Court announced the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause:
For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more
than one trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced
on the same verdict? Why is it that, having once been tried and
found guilty, he can never be tried again for that offence?
Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being a second time
found guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the
second conviction which is the real danger guarded against by the
Constitution. '"
Clearly, the Court in Lange considered the multiple punishment issue as one
most vital to the defendant. Thus, the Court held that the double jeopardy
clause was intended to prohibit more than multiple prosecutions: "The argument seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the Constitution was
designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the
same offence as from being twice tried for it."' 8 Lange followed quite closely
in the tradition of Madison's proposed double jeopardy clause because that
case required a convicted defendant to be punished only once.' 9
The problem with the wording of the double jeopardy clause was not
whether multiple punishments were permissible but rather the meaning of the
word "offence." A criminal act might well constitute more than one offense
for purposes of the clause. Thus, the issue of whether multiple punishments
are permissible is related closely to the question of whether a single criminal
act might amount to two or more offenses.

14. The Supreme Court recognized early on that the double jeopardy clause was designed to
prevent an accused from running the risk of "double punishment." See United States v. Ewell,
383 U.S. 116, 124 (1966).
Tibbs v. Florida,
15. This historical analysis has often been observed by the Court. See, e.g.,
457 U.S. 31, 40 n.14 (1982); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340-42 (1975); North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 729 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
16. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
17. Id.at 173.
18. Id.
19. More recent decisions indicate this same proposition, i.e., one punishment for a single
offense. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). Cf.United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) ("By contrast, where there is no threat of either multiple
punishment or successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended.").
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In Blockburger v. United States, 20 the Supreme Court established the test
to determine whether a single criminal act might constitute more than one offense. Recognizing that a legislature ordinarily does not intend to punish the
same act under two statutes, the Court devised a rule of construction to
determine when an act could be punished under more than one statute: "The
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." 2 ' Thus, the act would be
but one offense where both statutes required the same set of facts to constitute the crime, but where one statute required facts not needed to prove the
other, the criminal act would constitute two offenses.
The problem with the Blockburger test is that consistently it has been held
to be one of statutory construction rather than a constitutional rule."
Presumably, this is because the rule was developed only to address the question of how many times the legislature intended to prosecute a single act.
Thus, the rule was developed only to divine legislative intent from the structure of the overlapping statutes.
If Blockburger were deemed a constitutional rule, multiple punishments
would be prohibited by the double jeopardy clause whenever the test for
more than one offense could not be met. 3 However, since Blockburger is
used only for statutory construction, it might be constitutionally permissible
to punish a defendant under more than one statute even though Blockburger
would define only one offense.
Dicta in recent cases prior to Hunter suggested that acts that constituted
but one offense under Blockburger might be punishable under more than one
statute. In Whalen v. United States,2 4 the Court considered the question of
whether an accused might be convicted of rape and felony murder based on
the rape. Because a conviction for rape required no facts that a conviction
for felony murder in the commission of rape did not require, the act was but
one offense under Blockburger,25 and the judgment of conviction was
reversed.26
The Court in Whalen suggested that the defendant could have been punished
under both statutes despite the result under Blockburger. In fact, the Court
in dicta implied that such multiple punishment might be permissible. "And
where the offenses are the same under that test, cumulative sentences are not
permitted, unless elsewhere specially authorized by Congress." ' 27 The Court
20. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
21. Id. at 304, citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911).
22. See, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337 (1981); Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684, 691 (1980).
23. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11 (1978).
24. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
25. Id. at 694.
26. Id. at 695.
27. Id. at 693.
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879

appears to indicate that the double jeopardy clause would not prevent multiple punishments where Congress explicitly authorized them, despite the fact
that there was but one offense under Blockburger.
In Albernaz v. United States,28 the Supreme Court further reinforced this
incongruous result. In Albernaz, the defendant was convicted for conspiracy
to import marijuana and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. "9 Both convictions arose out of the same criminal act, the act of conspiracy. However, the
and
Court found that the act constituted two offenses under Blockburger,
30
concluded that punishment under both statutes was permissible.
The Court did not rest at a disposition of the case under Blockburger, but
said that had there been but one offense under that test, multiple
punishments would still have been permissible. The Albernaz Court cited
Whalen for the following proposition: "[T]he question whether punishments
imposed by a court after a defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are
unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what
punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized." ' 3' The Court then cited
dicta from Brown v. Ohio32 : "Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a

single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to
assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense." ' 33 Reasoning that Brown

defined the constitutional restriction as no more narrow than legislative intent and authorization, the Court in Albernaz then concluded: "Thus, the
question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different
from the question
of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be
4
imposed."

'3

Thus, the Albernaz Court rejected the notion that the double jeopardy
clause prohibited cumulative punishments for a single offense. "The
Blockburger test is a 'rule of statutory construction', and because it serves as
a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative
intent." ' 3 The precedential value of this language was questionable prior to

Hunter because Albernaz had been decided under Blockburger and further
discussion of constitutional issues was clearly dicta. 36 Justice Stewart noted

28. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
29. Id.at 334.

30. Id. at 344.
31. Id., citing Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688.
32. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
33. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
34. 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981).
35. Id. at 343 [citation omitted]. Thus, Blockburger is not held to be a constitutional rule
because the underlying assumption is that a legislative body does not intend to punish under
more than one statute. The test was devised to determine when the legislature would intend to
punish under more than one statute.
36. "The definitive ultimate and penultimate sentences of Albernaz are dicta, unnecessary to
Hunter v. State, 430 A.2d 476, 480 (Del. 1981).
reach the Court's conclusion in that case ....
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this in his concurring opinion. 37 "These statements are supported by neither
precedent nor reasoning and are unnecessary to reach the Court's
conclusion." ' 38 Justice Stewart was concerned about the tenuous connection
between the language in Whalen and that in Albernaz." However, the questionable nature of the Albernaz dicta was brief. In Hunter the Court adopted
the Albernaz position as its holding.
The Hunter Decision
The Missouri v. Hunter decision marked the end of a protracted battle
between the United States Supreme Court and the Missouri Supreme Court.
The Missouri legislature had enacted an "armed criminal action" statute,
which provided in part:
[A]ny person who commits any felony under the laws of this state
by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or
deadly weapon is also guilty of the crime of armed criminal action
and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment by the
division of corrections for a term of not less than three years. The
punishment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to any punishment provided by law for the crime committed
by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or
deadly weapon. 0
In Sours v. State," ' the defendant was convicted of first degree robbery by
means of a dangerous and deadly weapon and armed criminal action. The
Missouri Supreme Court reversed the conviction for armed criminal action
but affirmed the conviction for robbery because the two crimes were the
same offense under Blockburger. Thus the multiple convictions violated the
double jeopardy clause despite the presence of clear legislative authorization.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded for
consideration in light of the Whalen decision."' On remand, the Missouri
jeopardy clause barred
Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the4 double
3
punishment under both statutes cumulatively.
After Sours, the Missouri appellate court began reversing convictions
under the armed criminal action statute. In many cases, the state of Missouri
37. Justice Stewart authored the opinion in Whalen, which seemed to imply the dicta in
Albernaz. However, he concluded his Albernaz concurrence in a puzzling fashion, suggesting the
Blockburger test was constitutionally linked. "No matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could
not constitutionally provide for cumulative punishments unless each statutory offense required
proof of a fact that the other did not, under the criterion of Blockburger v. United States. [Citations omitted.] 450 U.S. 333, 345 (1981).
38. 450 U.S. at 345.
39. Id.
40. Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.225 (1979).
41. 593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.), vacated sub nom. Missouri v. Sours, 446 U.S. 962 (1980).
42. Missouri v. Sours, 446 U.S. 962 (1980).
43. Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1311 (1981).
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applied for writs of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of the United States
granted regularly, vacating and remanding for consideration in light of
Albernaz. 44 The Missouri Supreme Court held fast, and language in State v.
Kane4 typified the position of that court: "It is our conclusion that in order
to establish uniformity of sentencing in Sours type cases, the armed criminal
action sentence should be reversed in all instances."" The Missouri court
maintained the position that the statute, as enacted, violated the double
jeopardy clause by prescribing multiple punishments for one criminal
4
offense. 1
The Hunter case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari in the heat of the battle with the Missouri Supreme Court. In Hunter,
the defendant was convicted of first degree robbery and armed criminal action, but the Missouri appellate court set aside the armed criminal action
conviction consistent with the Missouri Supreme Court's previous holdings.41
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, ' 9 but this time declined
to vacate and remand for further state court consideration.
The Court discussed Whalen and Albernaz and found those cases control5 0 Albernaz
ling on the issue in Hunter.
had paved the way for multiple
punishments for a single offense where a legislature so authorized, and the
Court noted that the Missouri Supreme Court had found clear intent on the
part of the legislature to punish under both statutes 5 ' concluding:
Where, as here, a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative
punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two
statutes proscribe the "same" conduct under Blockburger, a
court's task of statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose
cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.5 1
Criticisms of Hunter
The Dissent
The majority opinion in Hunter was met with dissent by Justice
Marshall." The dissenting opinion focused on the constitutional issue, asserting that the double jeopardy clause was indeed implicated in a cumulative
punishment situation despite clear legislative intent that multiple punishments
44. See State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 49 n.2 (Mo. 1981).
45. 629 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. 1982), vacated 103 S.Ct. 1172 (1983).
46. 629 S.W.2d at 377.
47. The Missouri court suggested that the statute was constitutional when it was applied
merely to enhance punishment, rather than to define a separate crime. Id.
48. State v. Hunter, 622 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. App. 1981), vacated 103 S.Ct. 673 (1983).
49. 103 S.Ct. 218 (1982).
50. 103 S.Ct. at 678-679.
51. Id. at 679.
52. Id.

53. Justice Stevens joined Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion. Id.
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should be imposed. Justice Marshall noted the incongruous result that would
be reached under Hunter: "I do not believe that the phrase 'the same
offence' should be interpreted to mean one thing for the purposes of the prohibition against multiple prosecutions and something else for the purposes of
the prohibition against punishment." '
Justice Marshall stated several reasons why this result was possible under
Hunter. At the outset, he noted that armed criminal action and first degree
robbery constituted the same offense under the Blockburger test because
"[tlo punish respondent for first degree robbery, the State was not required
to prove a single fact in addition to what it had to prove to punish him for
armed criminal action." 5 As Marshall noted: "Respondent was thus
punished twice for the elements of first-degree robbery: once when he was
convicted and sentenced for that crime, and again when he was convicted and
sentenced for armed criminal action." ' 56 This multiple punishment was in
marked contrast to the fact that the defendant could not have been tried
separately for these two charges. 7 Obviously, Hunter allowed this result
because the double jeopardy clause was held not to affect what punishment
could be imposed.
Justice Marshall recognized that a legislature had "wide latitude to define
crimes and to prescribe the punishment for a given crime,"', but concluded
that
the Constitution does not permit a State to punish as two crimes
conduct that constitutes only one "offence" within the meaning
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 9 . . . If the Double Jeopardy
Clause imposed no restrictions on a legislature's power to
authorize multiple punishment, there would be no limit to the
number of convictions that a State could obtain on the basis of
the same act, state of mind, and result. A State would be free to
create ... a series of greater and lesser-included offenses, with the
first crime a lesser-included offense of the second, the second a
lesser-included offense of the third, and so on. 60 [Citation
omitted.]

54. Id.

55. Id. at 680.
56. Id.
57. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). These
cases prohibited a second prosecution on a lesser included offense of the crime for which a
defendant was first convicted or acquitted, and also a second prosecution for the higher substantive offense after prior conviction or acquittal on the lesser included offense.
58. 103 S.Ct. at 680.
59. Justice Marshall regarded the Blockburger test as determinative of whether the
punishments were for the same offense under the clause, a notion the majority had rejected in
both Albernaz and Hunter. "IT]here is no more reason to treat the test as simply a rule of
statutory construction in multiple punishment cases than there would be in multiple prosecution
cases." Id. at 682.
60. Id. at 680.
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Justice Marshall's concern may be well warranted. In Whalen the Court
decided that a defendant could not be convicted of both felony murder in the
commission of rape and the lesser included offense of rape at the same
trial.6 However, the Hunter decision may now limit Whalen to its particular
facts. Statutory law made clear that Congress did not intend to punish twice
' Thus, Whalen
for offenses arising out of the "same transaction." 62
would
control only cases where a legislature had expressly forbidden multiple
punishments for a single act by way of charging some lesser included offenses
as well. By contrast, Hunter purports to control where the legislature has expressed an intent to impose multiple punishments. The problem here is that
statutory schemes that do not fall under Whalen or Hunter have no appropriate controlling authority if both cases are read literally. In cases such
as these, the legislature may have enacted several statutes proscribing the
same conduct, as in Whalen, but provided no legislative guide as to whether
multiple punishment was intended. This is true with the typical series of
substantive crimes and their lesser included offenses.
Prior to the Hunter decision, Whalen, clearly forbade convicting and
punishing a defendant under a substantive offense and its lesser included offenses at the same trial. But Whalen dealt with a statutory scheme that prohibited multiple punishments. Even in that case, the dissent would have
allowed punishment under both statutes despite the legislative intent because
an appellate court had found that the legislature had intended to punish
cumulatively. 63 Thus, the direction of the Court is obvious, and the trend is
to permit multiple punishments in a growing number of cases. Justice
Stewart noted the breadth of the jump from Whalen to Albernaz and
Hunter." The next logical move for the Court would be to permit multiple
punishments where not forbidden by legislative intent. If this occurred, the
defendant could be charged, tried, convicted, and punished for a substantive
crime and its lesser included offense whenever legislative intent did not in6
dicate that such was not permissible. .
Justice Marshall addressed the argument that imposition of two
punishments was permissible under these circumstances because the state
could have achieved the same result by merely enhancing the punishment for
one substantive offense:
This argument incorrectly assumes that the total sentence imposed
is all that matters, and that the number of convictions that can be
obtained is of no relevance to the concerns underlying the Double
Jeopardy Clause . .

61.
62.
63.
64.

.

.The very fact that the State could simply

Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 694 (1980).
Id. at 691.
Id. at 707 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 345

(1981).
65. This is true despite the fact that, as in Hunter, the state could not try the separate
charges at different trials. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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convict a defendant such as respondent of one crime and impose
an appropriate punishment for that crime demonstrates that it has
no legitimate interest in seeking multiple

. . .

punishment."

Justice Marshall suggested that the multiple convictions were different from
for two reasons: each conviction has
a single charge with harsher' punishment
"'collateral consequences, 67 and the additional charges increase the
68
likelihood that the defendant will be found guilty.
Justice Marshall's criticisms are well taken. "The prosecution's ability to
bring multiple charges increases the risk that the defendant will be convicted on
one or more of those charges." 69 The Court has long recognized that the ability
to convict on lesser included offenses aids a prosecutor. Thus, in Beck v.
Alabama,"' the Court stated: "At common law the jury was permitted to find
the defendant guilty of any lesser offense necessarily included in the offense
charged. This rule originally developed as an aid to the prosecution in cases in
which the proof failed to establish some element of the crime charged."'"
Similarly, in Cichos v. Indiana'72 the advantages to the prosecution of possible conviction on lesser included offenses were discussed: "[lit [gives] the
prosecution the advantage of offering the jury a choice-a situation which is
apt to induce a doubtful jury to find the defendant guilty of the less serious
offense rather than to continue [to debate as] to his innocence."", Thus, the
extra charges permitted under Hunter merely because punishment is authorized violates a basic protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause-that
the prosecutor may not procedurally enhance the'probability that the defendant will be convicted. 74 Since multiple charges permissible under Hunter
present a far greater opportunity for conviction than a single charge, it is obnot equivalent and that Justice Marshall
vious that these procedures are
75
recognized a valid distinction.
66. 103 S.Ct. at 681-82. Justice Marshall finds the collateral consequences of multiple convictions to be an important factor. Id. at 681. However, Justice Brennan is on record as stating

that the most important factor is indeed the time spent in punishment: "1 suggest that most
defendants are more concerned with how much time they must spend in prison than with
whether their record shows a conviction. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 149

(1980)."
67. Such consequences might be civil disabilities, or differential treatment under a habitual
offender statute. Id. at 681.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
71. Id. at 633.
72. 385 U.S. 76 (1965).
73. Id. at 81 (Fortas, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). Justice Marshall took note
of Cichos in his Hunter dissent. 103 S.Ct. at 681.
74. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
75. This analysis is not without problems, however. Under the typical procedure, lesser included offenses are often submitted to the jury even where the state is not seeking a conviction
under more than one statute. Thus, the advantage contemplated by Beck and Cichos would
often be present without the Hunter result.
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The Problem of Inconsistent Verdicts
Another problem with the Hunter decision is that it may require a rethinking of the issue of inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases. The Court has held
that verdicts need not be consistent to sustain convictions. 76 However, the
cases so holding have always involved indictments or informations with
multiple counts, and the inconsistency permitted by the Court was inconsistency between separate counts." The Court never has addressed the issue
of inconsistent verdicts in terms of the Hunter fact pattern, and thus inconsistent verdicts in these cases may merit different treatment.
Multicount indictments or informations involve charges that will be
seperate offenses under Blockburger. Each count defines a crime punishable
by statute, and each count is distinct from another count in that it requires
different proof. Further, separate counts could be tried at separate trials in
most states. Thus, inconsistent verdicts in this setting may reflect failure of
proof or insufficiency of evidence as to one particular count and should not
disturb the judgment of guilt on other counts.
Under the Hunter fact pattern, however, this is not the case. The two
charges are the same offense under Blockburger. Here, inconsistent verdicts
may assume a different meaning. An acquittal as to armed criminal action
should logically be considered as an acquittal of the underlying felony of first
degree robbery. In resolving factual issues, the jury could not conclude in
any sensible manner that a person committed robbery with a firearm without
finding him guilty of committing a felony with a firearm. One charge logically implies the other, and inconsistent verdicts in this type of situation are irreconcilable. Thus, the Hunter decision may necessitate a reconsideration of
78
the policy of allowing inconsistent verdicts.
The Effect on Oklahoma Law
The Oklahoma Statutes provide the authorization for multiple
punishments with a statute much like Missouri's. Oklahoma's statute provides, in part:
Any person who, while committing or attempting to commit a
felony, possesses a firearm or any other offensive weapon in such
commission or attempt . . . . in addition to the penalty provided
76. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 101 (1974); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943); Dunn v. United States, 2 4 U.S. 390, 393 (1932). See
generally Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Different-Jurors Verdicts, and American Jury Theory:
Whether Verdicts Are Invalidated by Juror Disagreement on Issues, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 473

(1983).
77. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 101 (1974); United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277, 279 (1943); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932).

78. At least one court has concluded that inconsistent verdicts are never erroneous in
criminal cases. In People v. Vaughn, 409 Mich. 463, 466, 295 N.W.2d 354, 355 (1980), the
Supreme Court of Michigan concluded that inconsistent verdicts were permissible because of the
"mercy dispensing power of the jury."
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by the statutefor the felony committed or attempted, upon conviction shall be guilty of a felony for possessing such weapon or
device, which shall be a separate offense, and shall be punishable
by imprisonment .... 19
Thus, Oklahoma would seem at first glance to be subject to the Hunter decision because under Hunter multiple punishments would be permitted, given
the statutory authorization. This may not be so, however, because there may
be independent state grounds for ignoring Hunter. The Supreme Court of the
United States has long held that it has no control over issues that are determined wholly on state grounds, 80 and has remanded cases repeatedly to state
courts for a determination whether the decision was so based. 8' Therefore, if
Oklahoma law forbids multiple punishments and state courts enforce this
law, Hunter would have no effect on these state cases.
Initially, the question is one of state constitutional law. The Federal Constitution does not prohibit multiple punishments, but it is elementary that the
state constitution can provide more protection than the federal. 2 Thus, if the
protection,
Oklahoma constitution's double jeopardy clause confers more
83
Hunter would be inapplicable to criminal trials in this state.
The Oklahoma constitution's provision which is analogous to the fifth
amendment double jeopardy clause provides in part: "[N]or shall any person, after having been once acquitted by a jury, be again put in jeopardy of
life or liberty for that of which he has been acquitted. Nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense." 4 Clearly,
the language encompasses little more than the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment, despite some differences in wording. The first part of the
Oklahoma clause is similar to the Missouri provision, which the Supreme
Court rejected as a basis for the state court decision. The last sentence is only
slightly different from the fifth amendment clause. Thus, the language seems
to afford no greater double jeopardy protection that the fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has indicated that it construes
the Oklahoma clause much the same as the Supreme Court of the United
States construes the fifth amendment. In Stockton v. State,81 the Court of
Criminal Appeals announced that double jeopardy barred multiple prosecutions where the second prosecution required the same evidence that was
necessary for the first prosecution to end in conviction. Thus, the Oklahoma
court used a test similar to Blockburger to determine whether multiple prosecutions were permissible.
79. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1287 (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
80. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935).

81. See, e.g., California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
82. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 680-81 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. The Court in Hunter noted that the Missouri decisions were based on the United States
Constitution. 103 S.Ct. at 676 n.1.
84. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 21.
85. 509 P.2d 153 (Okla. Cr. App. 1973).
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NOTES

The court has not addressed the issue of whether multiple punishments
would be permissible under the Oklahoma constitution because it is not
necessary to do so. The Oklahoma statute provides the answer: "But an act
or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions ...but in
no case can he be punished under more than one." ' 86 Thus, Oklahoma
prevents multiple punishments for a single offense under more than one
statute, regardless of what punishments might be legislatively authorized.
Realizing the inherent conflict between the procedural statute and the armed
criminal action statute, the court has resolved the87 issue in favor of the
statutory prohibition against multiple punishments.
It is arguable that the Court of Criminal Appeals has resolved that dispute
under the assumption that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment
prohibits multiple punishments for a single criminal offense. If this were so,
Hunter would provide the opportunity for a new construction, which might
allow the multiple punishments because the Oklahoma armed criminal action
statute authorizes such a procedure. Under this new construction, the expression of legislative intent in the statute could be deemed to impliedly repeal
the procedural prohibition for the purposes of the armed criminal action
statute. However, this is an unlikely result, and in any event, the leading case
construing the armed criminal statute, Grace v. Harris,8s decided the issue
wholly on statutory grounds and did not mention what effect the Federal
Constitution might have on the imposition of multiple punishments for one
criminal offense.8 9
Conclusion
In Hunter the Supreme Court validated its dicta in Albernaz by holding
that multiple punishments for a single offense encounter no double jeopardy
bar. This is because the Court considers the Blockburger test as applying only
to situations where the legislature has not evinced an intent to punish
cumulatively. Thus, where the legislature does express intent to so punish,
Blockburger does not define the "same offense" for the double jeopardy
purposes and the intended punishment is constitutionally permissible.
The result is questionable at best. If Blockburger is used to determine when
multiple prosecutions are constitutionally permissible, it is difficult to
understand why that test should not be used to determine whether multiple
86. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 11 (1981).
87. Grace v. Harris, 485 P.2d 757 (Okla. Cr. App. 1971), overruled on other grounds, State
v. Edens, 565 P.2d 51 (Okla. Cr. App. 1972) (construing 21 OKLA. STAT. § 11 (Supp. 1982)).
88. 485 P.2d 757 (Okla. Cr. App. 1971).
89. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1287 (Supp. 1982). Section 1287 expressly defines crimes under that
section as a "separate offense" from the substantive crime, id. However, such a mechanistic
device should not change the result under the constitutional or statutory analyses because the test
of what constitutes an offense should be independent of definitions given to suit particular
statutes. Justice Marshall also advanced this reasoning in his dissent, applying it to the constitutional issue. 103 S.Ct. at 682.
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